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Abstract 
 
In various writings Karl Marx made references to an ‘aristocracy of finance’ in Western 
Europe and the United States that dominated ownership of the public debt. Drawing on 
original research, this article offers the first comprehensive analysis of public debt ownership 
within the US corporate sector. The research shows that over the past three decades, and 
especially in the context of the current crisis, a new aristocracy of finance has emerged, as 
holdings of the public debt have become rapidly concentrated in favor of large corporations 
classified within Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE). Operationalizing Wolfgang 
Streeck’s concept of the ‘debt state’, the article goes on to demonstrate how concentration in 
ownership of the public debt reinforces patterns of social inequality and proceeds in tandem 
with a shift in government policy, one that prioritizes the interests of government 
bondholders over the general citizenry.   
 
SER keywords: public finance; financial institutions; distribution; redistribution; financial 
crisis; class 
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‘By the aristocracy of finance must here be understood not merely the great loan promoters 
and speculators in public funds, in regard to whom it is immediately obvious that their 
interests coincide with the interests of state power. All modern finance, the whole of the 
banking business, is interwoven with public credit […] If in every epoch the stability of state 
power signified Moses and the prophets to the entire money market and to the priests of this 
money market, why not all the more so today, when every deluge threatens to sweep away 
the old states, and the old state debts with them?’ 
  -Karl Marx, 1963 [1852], p. 104 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Focusing on the United States, this article forms part of a broader research project on the 
ownership of the public debt (Tett, 2013). A previous article focused on the household 
sector and revealed a rapid concentration in ownership of the public debt in favour of the 
top one percent of US households since the early 1980s (Hager, 2014). The current article 
extends this research by analyzing the distribution of the public debt within the US corporate 
sector. Taken together, both articles provide crucial yet hitherto unavailable evidence for 
longstanding debates about the ownership structure of the federal bond market.1  
 
The history of political economy is filled with references to the banks and other financial 
firms that lent to government (Gottlieb, 1956; Hume, 1970 [1752]; Hudson, 2011). Of the 
earliest works, Karl Marx most explicitly discussed the political economy of public debt 
ownership. In various writings Marx made references to an ‘aristocracy of finance’ in 
Western Europe and the United States that dominated ownership and trading of 
government bonds (Marx, 1963 [1852], p. 104; Marx and Engels, 1970 [1846], pp. 79–80; 
Marx, 1990 [1867], p. 920). For Marx, ownership of the public debt not only empowered 
bondholders to influence government policies, it also had class redistributive effects. 
Concentrated ownership of the public debt was combined with regressive systems of 
taxation on ‘the most necessary means of subsistence’ (Marx, 1990 [1867], p. 920). And this 
dynamic, especially in Britain, meant that the public debt served to redistribute or 
‘expropriate’ income from the laboring masses of taxpayers to capitalist bondholders.  
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Writing mid-nineteenth century, Marx offered no empirical evidence to substantiate his 
arguments regarding the aristocracy of finance. And despite the twentieth century rise of 
statistics and accounting, our understanding of the ownership of the public debt is still 
severely limited. Some observers of the US have suggested that large financial groups 
dominate ownership of the public debt (Adams, 1887; O’Connor, 1973; Canterbery, 2000). 
Yet, of the existing studies, only the work of H.C. Adams (1887) from over a century ago 
made a concerted effort to map the concentration in corporate ownership of the public debt. 
The patchy and outdated empirical record means that we lack even the most basic 
understanding of what has happened to the aristocracy of finance over the past 150 years.  
 
The global financial crisis has brought in its wake increasing attention to the rise of finance, 
the consolidation of corporate and class power, intensifying income and wealth inequality, as 
well as skyrocketing public debts. And in this context, it seems that Marx’s writings on the 
public debt might be as relevant as ever. This article revisits Marx’s notion of an aristocracy 
of finance by addressing the following questions. Who are the dominant corporate owners 
of the US public debt? Has public debt ownership become more or less concentrated over 
time? Is the public debt still concentrated in the financial sector, or has the so-called 
financialization of industrial firms spread ownership across different sectors? Has the recent 
rise in money manager funds, including pension, mutual and other investment funds, 
transformed the class politics of public indebtedness? Does the public debt still redistribute 
income between classes? And finally, what are the political consequences of a given pattern 
of public debt ownership?  
 
In short, the analysis uncovers a mixture of continuity and change. The research shows that 
over the past three decades, and especially in the context of the crisis, corporate sector 
holdings of the public debt have become rapidly concentrated in favor of large corporations 
classified within the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) sector. This rise in 
ownership concentration suggests that the aristocracy of finance is still a relevant feature of 
contemporary US capitalism. At the same time, however, the research also reveals significant 
changes in financial sector ownership of the public debt. In Marx’s time it was traditional 
banking institutions owned by wealthy capitalists that were dominant. Today the major 
corporate owners of the public debt are money managers, many of which are widely owned. 
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Thus the class underpinnings of the public debt are now much murkier than they were in the 
nineteenth century, as broader swathes of the population have an indirect stake in the public 
debt owned by corporations. Yet this general observation conceals transformations in the 
types of money managers that own the public debt. Over the past three decades widely 
owned pension funds have seen their share of the public debt fall drastically, while mutual 
funds, which are heavily concentrated in the hands of the top one percent of US households, 
have seen their share increase. The findings therefore point toward the emergence of a new 
aristocracy of finance, composed of giant money managers and wealthy households. 
 
The article then examines the consequences of increasing concentration in ownership of the 
public debt, first, by looking its class redistributive effects, and second, by gauging the extent 
to which concentrated ownership gives the new aristocracy of finance power over 
government policymaking. In exploring these two facets, the research in this article provides 
empirical grounding for conceptual arguments made by Wolfgang Streeck (2014) in his 
recent book Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. The rise of progressive 
taxation and social spending indicates that the US public debt no longer redistributes income 
in the way that it did in nineteenth-century Britain. But this does not mean that issues of 
class and inequality are no longer relevant to the public debt. Operationalizing Wolfgang 
Streeck’s (2014) concept of the ‘debt state’ helps us to grasp how increased ownership 
concentration and a rising public debt, along with tax stagnation and declining tax 
progressivity since the 1970s, have combined to reinforce existing patterns of social 
inequality. A content analysis of the Economic Report of the President reveals that, under the debt 
state, there has been a shift in government policy that prioritizes the interests of what 
Streeck refers to as the Marktvolk (the large financial corporations and wealthy households 
that dominate ownership of the public debt) at expense of the Staatsvolk (the general 
citizenry). In this way, the analysis reveals how growing inequality in ownership of the public 
debt has gone hand in hand with growing inequality in representation within government 
policy.  
 
The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. Section two highlights some of the 
challenges in measuring concentration and maps the pattern of public debt ownership for 
the corporate sector. Section three explores the redistributive effects of this increasingly 
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concentrated pattern of public debt ownership, while section four undertakes a content 
analysis. A fifth and concluding section briefly discusses the relevance of the findings to 
financialization studies and considers how the research might inform public debate.  
 
2. Mapping Ownership 
 
To explore whether the aristocracy of finance is still a relevant feature of US capitalism we 
start with the category that matters most: ownership. It was concentrated ownership of the 
public debt that Marx and others emphasized for two main reasons. First, when combined 
with a regressive system of taxation, a concentrated public debt redistributed income from 
taxpayers to bondholders. Second, concentrated ownership gave owners of the public debt 
inordinate power over government policy-making. Our starting point in this section, 
therefore, is to map the share of the public debt owned by dominant finance as it unfolds 
over time.  
 
2.1 The Measurement Problem 
 
Measurement of ownership concentration raises a host of methodological issues. In their 
pioneering ‘capital as power’ framework, Nitzan and Bichler (2009) note that a consistent, 
historical measure of ownership concentration requires the use of either a fixed number or a 
fixed proportion of dominant owners (Bichler and Nitzan, 2012, p. 51). For example, in the 
context of this study, we can use the standard aggregate measure of concentration, taking the 
top 200 or top 500 corporations as our numerator, and measure their share of corporate 
holdings of the public debt. Or we can take the top one percent of corporations or the top 
ten percent of corporations and measure their share of corporate holdings of the public 
debt.  
 
The exact cut-off point used to isolate dominant owners is to a certain extent arbitrary, but 
necessary in order to create a reliable measure of concentration. And this is precisely what is 
wrong with the only data set available to track the pattern of public debt ownership for 
dominant corporations, the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI). The SOI does not make publicly 
available a raw data set to freely choose our own cut-off point and the data that are publicly 
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available do not use a fixed number or a fixed proportion of top corporations to measure 
concentration over long periods of time. Instead, the SOI tabulates the share of the public 
debt owned by corporations divided into different categories based on the size of their total 
assets.  
 
From 1954, when reliable data first surfaces, to 2000, any corporation with assets of $250 
million or more was placed into the top asset bracket. In 1954, only 391 corporations, or 
0.06 percent of total corporations, were included in the top asset bracket of $250 million or 
more. Yet by 2000, the last year that this cut-off point was used to designate the top bracket, 
10,883 corporations, or 0.2 percent of the total corporations, had $250 million or more in 
assets. It was not until 2001 that the IRS refined its categories and made assets of $2.5 billion 
or more the top cut-off point. With the refined categories introduced in 2001, 1,896 
corporations, or 0.04 percent of total corporations, were included in the top bracket of $2.5 
billion or more in assets, and these totals increased to 2,772 and 0.05 percent respectively by 
2010. 
 
Keeping the cut-off point at a given level of assets means that the number of top 
corporations, the proportion of top corporations, and therefore the asset share of top 
corporations, increases greatly over time. Basing the cut-off point on the size of assets, 
rather than the number of corporations, the SOI data present obvious problems for our 
inquiry. Without a fixed cut-off point, a change in the share of public debt owned by 
corporations in the top asset bracket could reflect a change in the number of corporations, 
as well as a change in concentration. 
 
2.2 A Roundabout Solution 
 
The limitations of the IRS SOI data might help to explain why the empirical record of the 
existing literature is patchy and outdated. Without access to reliable data, it is little wonder 
that researchers have not mapped the concentration of public debt within the US corporate 
sector. But all is not completely lost. There is still a roundabout method that can be used to 
tease out insights from the SOI data.  
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This method involves playing around with the SOI asset class categories to come up with a 
fixed number of corporations in different snapshots of time. As was already mentioned, the 
SOI finally refined its asset classes in 2001, increasing the top cut-off point from assets of 
$250 million or more to assets of $2.5 billion or more. For the most recent five years (2006-
10) around 2,500 corporations were included in this top asset bracket of $2.5 billion or more 
in assets. 
 
It should be noted that the top 2,500 corporations do not represent an ideal proxy for 
dominant owners, as it is likely to contain not only the largest corporations, but also a 
significant number of medium-sized entities. But this is the limitation imposed by the SOI 
data. Going back historically, we can examine the SOI asset classes and isolate 2,500 top 
corporations at different points in time. For the five-year period from 1977-81 there were on 
average just over 2,500 corporations with assets of $250 million or more. If we go back 
further to 1957-61, there were around 2,500 corporations with assets of $50 million or more.  
 
Using these three snapshots periods (1957-61, 1977-81, 2006-10) gives us a reasonably 
consistent, long-term view of ownership concentration for a fixed number of top 
corporations in the numerator. The historical snapshot data for these three periods are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Historical Snapshots of Corporate Ownership of the Public Debt 
Period Large 
Corporations 
(total) 
Large 
Corporations 
(% total) 
Public Debt* 
(% total) 
Total Assets** 
(% total) 
1957-61 2,344 0.2 66 62 
1977-81 2,676 0.1 65 70  
2006-10 2,675 0.05 82 81 
* Refers to the share of corporate holdings of the public debt that are owned by large corporations. 
 
**Refers to the share of corporate holdings of total assets that are owned by large corporations.  
 
Note: The values in the last three columns are calculated as simple averages for the corresponding five-year 
period. The cutoff point for large corporation is assets of $50 million or more for 1957-61, $250 million or 
more for 1977-81, $2.5 billion or more for 2006-10.  
 
Source: IRS Statistics of Income (http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2).  
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Skeptics will point out that the number of corporations in the first period (1957- 1961) in the 
second column of Table 1 is 14 percent lower than for the latter two periods. But this 
discrepancy is compensated for when we take into account the third column of the table, 
which measures the proportion of top corporations. The successive decline in the 
proportion of top corporations through the three periods is far more significant than the 
increase in the fixed number of corporations from 1957-1961 to 1977-1981. Given the 
successive halving in this proportion, we could argue that these data understate the level of 
ownership concentration for the more recent periods. 
 
2.3 The Aristocracy 
 
The data in the fourth column of Table 1 track the corporate share of the US public debt 
owned by large corporations. As we can see, the ownership share of large corporations was 
remarkably steady at around 65 percent from the postwar Golden Age (1957-1961) through 
the early years of the neoliberal period (1977-1981). Where we start to see significant 
changes is from the second period to the third period.  
 
Based on the available data we can see that there has been an increase in ownership 
concentration over the past three decades. Although the top 2,500 corporations make up 
only 0.05 percent of total corporate tax returns in 2006-2010, they now own 82 percent of 
the corporate share of the public debt. What is perhaps most interesting, and which is not 
reflected in the data in Table 1, is the increase in ownership concentration that has taken 
place in the context of the global financial crisis. In 2006 before the onset of the crisis, large 
corporations owned 77 percent of the corporate share of the public debt and this share grew 
to 86 percent in 2010. 
 
Finally, the fifth column in Table 1 maps the share of total corporate assets owned by large 
corporations. What stands out is the remarkable synchronicity of public debt and general 
asset concentration. From the postwar to the early neoliberal period, the share of total 
corporate assets owned by large corporations grew modestly from 62 percent to 70 percent. 
Yet over the past three decades there has been rapid concentration, as large corporations in 
2006-2010 owned 81 percent of total corporate assets.   
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The data in Table 1 tell us at least three important things. First, the rise in ownership 
concentration suggests that there is still an aristocracy of large corporations at the heart of 
the US public debt. Second, the data also indicate whose interests have been served by 
increases in the public debt during the global financial crisis. The market for US federal debt 
has been a traditional ‘safe haven’ for investors in times of turbulence and during the crisis 
there has been a ‘flight to safety’ to federal bonds (Noeth and Sengupta, 2010). What the 
data in Table 1 show is that an unequal dynamic underpins the safe haven: it is 
overwhelmingly large corporations at the top of the business hierarchy that have enjoyed the 
current ‘flight to safety’. And third, the data show that ownership concentration in the public 
debt is bound up with a broader movement toward asset concentration.  
 
2.4 Is the Aristocracy Still Financial?  
 
Of course the ‘aristocracy’ Marx identified was specifically an aristocracy of finance, a group 
that comprised not only the ‘loan promoters and speculators’ (the modern day equivalent of 
investment banks) but ‘all modern finance’ and ‘the whole of the banking business’ that 
dominated the ownership and trading of government securities (see quote at the beginning 
of this article). It remains to be seen whether ‘finance’, understood narrowly as financial 
firms, is still the dominant owner of the public debt within the US corporate sector. 
 
This line of inquiry has relevance for the literature on the financialization of advanced 
capitalist economics since the 1970s. One aspect of financialization has to do with the rising 
profits of the finance insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector (Krippner, 2005; Foster and 
Magdoff, 2009; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011). Emphasizing this aspect of 
financialization, we might expect to see an increase in FIRE’s share of the US public debt 
alongside its growing share of profits. Yet another aspect of financialization involves the 
trend towards diversification and conglomeration, with traditionally ‘industrial’ corporations 
such as General Electric and General Motors taking on more activities related to financial 
intermediation (see Froud et al., 2006; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). As a result of the 
financialization of industrial firms, we might just as well expect ownership of the public debt 
to spread across different sectors and thereby decrease the share owned by the FIRE sector. 
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When it comes to ownership of the public debt, it is the former aspect of financialization 
that holds sway. Figure 1 traces the share of corporate holdings of the public debt owned by 
corporations within FIRE. We see that over the past half century, the financial sector has 
greatly increased its share of the public debt. Even at its lowest point of 81 percent in 1959, 
the FIRE sector was by far the most significant corporate owner of the public debt, and over 
the past five decades its share has steadily increased. From 2000 to 2010 FIRE owned on 
average 98 percent of the corporate share of the public debt. Thus ownership of the US 
public debt has become concentrated into the hands of not just large corporations, but large 
FIRE sector corporations.  
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Figure 1 FIRE's Share of the Public Debt Held by Corporations 
 
Note: The series appears broken at points because of missing observations for those years.   
 
Source: IRS Statistics of Income (http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2).  
percent percent 
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2.5 The Rise of Money Managers 
 
To this point our analysis has ignored one of the most fundamental changes within the 
financial sector over the past half-century: the rise of money managers, including pension, 
mutual and other investment funds.2 In Marx’s time, the financial sector included mostly 
banks, whereas today it includes a host of non-traditional intermediaries. And while 
ownership of banks in Marx’s time was dominated by the capitalist class, money managed 
funds are generally owned by broader swathes of the population. The rise of money 
managed funds forces us to think in more nuanced ways about the class underpinnings of 
the public debt. If most investment funds are widely held, this could mean that individuals 
outside of the ruling elite are the indirect beneficiaries of these concentrated holdings of the 
public debt.  
 
There is no denying that money managers have become major players in the federal bond 
market. As the thin series in Figure 2 indicates, the share of the US public debt owned by 
these entities rose sharply from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s and has remained fairly 
stable from 1985 to the present.3 To illustrate the changes, we can compare the share of the 
public debt owned by money managers to that of the banking sector (the thick series). Here 
we see that the share of the public debt owned directly by banks has fallen precipitously 
since World War II and now stands at a miniscule three percent of the total. 
 
But to what extent has the emergence of money manger funds transformed the class politics 
of public debt ownership? To answer this question we need to dig deeper, first, to 
disaggregate the category of money managers and examine their ownership structures, and 
second, to map the share of the public debt owned by the various types of funds. Pensions 
funds, for their part, are indeed widely owned, with the top percentile of US households 
owning only 15 percent of their total assets in 2010 (up from eight percent in 1983).4 The 
ownership of mutual funds, however, is heavily concentrated, with the top percentile owning 
47 percent of their total assets in 2010 (up from 40 percent in 1983). Put simply, this means 
that the middle class is the indirect beneficiary of the public debt owned by pension funds, 
but not by mutual funds. It follows that in order for the financial sector’s holdings of the 
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public debt to serve the middle class, we would have to see evidence that pension funds are 
the major owners of the public debt within the category of money managers.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 provides a breakdown of the ownership of the public debt by money managers. As 
we can see, the share owned by pension funds has fallen sharply from 14 percent in the mid-
1980s to six percent in 2014. Meanwhile, the share owned by mutual funds has increased 
steadily since the early 1980s and, despite a significant dip in the past few years, still stands at 
around 10 percent. Expressed as a ratio, the share of the public debt owned by heavily 
concentrated mutual funds was on average only 25 percent of the share owned by widely 
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Figure 2 The FIRE Sector's Share of 'Debt Held by the Public' 
 
Note: 'Debt held by the public' includes domestic private, official and private foreign and Federal 
Reserve holdings of Treasury securities. Money managers include private pension funds, state and 
local government retirement funds, federal government retirement funds, money market mutual 
funds, mutual funds, closed-end funds and exchange-traded funds. Banks include U.S.-chartered 
depository institutions, foreign banking offices in the U.S., banks in U.S.-affiliated areas and credit 
unions. Data are quareterly from 1945 to 1951 and annual onward.  
 
Source: Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds accounts (table L.209).  
percent percent 
Banks 
Money Managers 
 12 
held pension funds in the early 1980s (1980 to 1985). In the past five years (2009 to 2014) 
mutual fund holdings of the public debt were on average 1.7 times larger than the holdings of 
pension funds.  
 
The institutionalization of savings into money manager funds is undeniably significant. But 
in and of itself the increasing significance of money managers has not counteracted 
increasing concentration in the financial sector’s direct ownership of the public debt. On the 
contrary, funds that are widely held have seen their share of public debt fall over the past 
three decades, while the share of concentrated funds has increased.  
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Figure 3 Money Managers and 'Debt Held by the Public' 
 
Note: 'Debt held by the public' includes domestic private, official and private foreign and Federal 
Reserve holdings of Treasury securities. Pension funds include private pension funds, state and 
local government retirement funds, federal government retirement funds. Mutual funds include 
money market mutual funds, mutual funds, closed-end funds and exchange-traded funds. Data are 
quarterly from 1945 to 1951 and annual onward.  
 
Source: Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds accounts (table L.209).  
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While Marx’s aristocracy of finance was comprised of banks and their capitalist owners, the 
new aristocracy includes a whole array of intermediaries, many of which cannot be said to 
work exclusively in the interests of the wealthy elite. Yet over the past three decades, funds 
that are more concentrated in the hands of the top percentile of US households have 
increased their share of the public debt. This means that the top one percent of households 
are increasingly the indirect beneficiaries of the concentrated share of the public debt owned 
within the FIRE sector. These findings are consistent with previous research, which found 
that, in terms of direct household ownership, the top one percent has greatly increased its 
share of the public debt over the past three decades (Hager, 2014). Thus the new aristocracy 
of finance is best conceptualized as a power bloc comprising not only dominant financial 
corporations, but also US households at the top of the wealth and income hierarchy.5  
  
3. Public Debt and Class Redistribution 
 
For Marx, one of the most important consequences of concentrated ownership of the public 
debt was that it redistributed income upward from the laboring masses of taxpayers to the 
aristocracy of government bondholders. The redistributive logic appears straightforward. 
Ownership of a government bond entitles its owner to a stream of interest payments. And if 
the class identity of bondholders is separate from the taxpayers that finance those interest 
payments, then income will be redistributed from the latter to the former. 
 
3.1 Then and Now 
 
Historical statistics allow us to illustrate the class conflict underpinning the public finances of 
Marx’s time.6 With British public debt well in excess of 100 percent of GDP, often 
exceeding 250 percent of GDP during major wars, interest income constituted a major 
component of government spending. From 1800 to 1850, debt service charges made up 
anywhere from 25 to 58 percent of total British government expenditures. Until the mid-
1800s government spending was almost solely dedicated to war and debt servicing. In fact, 
military spending and debt charges as a share of government expenditures oscillated counter-
cyclically. New military campaigns would bring with them an upsurge in military spending 
and a decline in debt charges. The conclusion of conflict would result in decreased military 
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spending and an increase in debt charges, as the British state began to repay some of the 
debt contracted during the war.  
 
While interest payments constituted a substantial share of government expenditures during 
this period, the bulk of government revenues came from indirect forms of taxation. Indirect 
taxes, especially excise taxes on consumption goods, are generally regressive since they are 
assessed on goods that, as a percentage of income, are primarily purchased by the poor 
(Marx’s ‘most necessary means of subsistence’). Meanwhile direct taxes, especially property 
and income taxes, are generally progressive, exempting lower incomes and falling 
inordinately on the wealth and income of the rich. In the first half of the nineteenth century, 
66 percent of British government revenues on average came from indirect taxes, while 
income and property taxes constituted a meager 16 percent. There was little in the way of 
social spending to offset the tax burden borne by the working masses. 
 
Fast-forward to the contemporary US and things are not as clear-cut.7 During the global 
crisis US public debt levels breached the 100 percent of GDP mark, the only time they have 
done so outside of World War II. But low interest rates mean that debt service makes up a 
small component of federal expenditures. In fact, from 2008 to 2013 interest charges on 
average have made up just over six percent of annual federal expenditures, while military 
spending made up 20 percent. But unlike in nineteenth-century Britain, the US federal 
government also dedicates around 35 percent of its spending to social security and 
healthcare, a substantial proportion of which benefits lower and middle income Americans.  
 
There are also major differences in the tax structures of nineteenth-century Britain and 
contemporary America. In 2013, 61 percent of US federal revenues came from individual 
and corporate income taxes and a miniscule three percent from excise taxes. And although 
some economists have argued convincingly that the US federal tax structure of the past three 
decades has declined in progressivity (Piketty and Saez, 2007), it is nowhere near a return to 
the regressive tax structure of the nineteenth century.  
 
With the rise of progressive taxation and social spending, the class redistributive effects of 
the public debt are harder to pin down. Corporate income taxes make up only 10 percent of 
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total US federal revenues, but the large corporations sampled in Table 1 contribute most. In 
fact in the most recent period of 2006-2010, the top 2,500 corporations paid 68 percent of 
all corporate income taxes. Household income taxes make up nearly half of all federal 
revenues, and the top one percent of Americans pays a large share. According to recent data 
from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2014), the top one percent paid 35 percent of 
household income taxes in 2011, nearly double the amount it paid in 1979. With large 
corporations and wealthy households paying the bulk of federal taxes, the US public debt 
does not redistribute income from the taxpaying masses to the aristocracy of government 
bondholders as it did in nineteenth-century Britain.  
 
But this does not mean that issues of class and inequality are no longer relevant to the public 
debt. Instead, a new, more complex, type of conflict between the social classes has emerged. 
This new conflict is captured in Wolfgang Streeck’s concept of the ‘debt state’.  
 
3.2 The ‘Debt State’ 
 
In Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, Streeck (2014) traces the 
transformation of capitalism within the advanced democracies from the postwar to the 
neoliberal period. Key to this broader transformation has been a shift in public finances 
from a postwar ‘tax state’, which relied primarily on progressive taxation to finance its 
expenditures, to a ‘debt state’ of the past four decades, which finances its expenditures 
through borrowing. There are two main features of this ‘debt state’ that are relevant to our 
discussion here: namely, tax stagnation and declining tax progressivity. Both of these features 
help us to understand the contemporary link between public debt and class inequality.  
 
We start with the issue of tax stagnation. As mentioned above, the financial aristocracy now 
pays a substantial share of federal taxes. However, this observation ignores the fact that the 
tax revenues as a percentage of national income have stagnated since the early 1970s. Figure 
4 plots US federal expenditures and tax revenues as a percentage of GDP from 1950 to 
2014. In the postwar period increasing federal expenditures were met by increasing tax 
revenues, resulting in a low public debt. But this started to change from the 1970s onward. 
With the exception of the 1990s, federal revenues have been increasing, while federal taxes 
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have been stagnant. The growing gap between revenues and expenditures accounts for the 
growing levels of public indebtedness over the past four decades.   
 
Drawing on some of the classical work of fiscal sociology, Streeck (2014, pp. 70-75) sets out 
to explain these changes. He suggests that increasing government expenditures are a 
function of development. As the capitalist market deepens, the state must spend more on 
things like infrastructure and social protection. Stagnating tax revenues are, however, more 
overtly political. As wealth and income becomes concentrated in the hands of dominant 
property owners, governments face difficulties extracting revenues from them. Thus for 
Streeck, the main factor that explains the emergence of the debt state over the past four 
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Source: White House Office of Management and Budget (Table 1.2). 
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decades has been the successful tax resistance waged on the part of increasingly powerful 
elites. 
 
How does tax progressivity relate to the issue of tax stagnation? Though large corporations 
and wealthy households pay a significant portion of the federal tax bill, they are paying less 
and less tax as a proportion of their total income. The effective federal tax income rate for 
the large corporations sampled in Table 1 held steady over the course of the neoliberal 
period, increasing from 22 percent in 1977-1981 to 23 percent in 2006-2010. This represents 
a significant decline from the postwar period of 1956-1961, when the effective corporate 
income tax rate stood at 45 percent. CBO (2014) data suggest that the effective federal tax 
rate for households has fallen from 35 percent in 1979 to 29 percent in 2011. Earlier 
research by Piketty and Saez (2007), which ignores the role of transfers and is therefore not 
directly comparable to the CBO data, finds that the effective tax rate of the top one percent 
fell from 44 percent in 1960 to 38 percent in 2001.  
 
As Streeck (2014, pp. 76-77) points out, declining tax progressivity means increasing 
inequality and, inter alia, increased savings for those at the top of the wealth and income 
hierarchy. Those that have gained the most from declining tax progressivity have more 
money to invest in safe, secure, interest-bearing financial assets. And here is where we find 
the link between class inequality and public indebtedness. The public debt grows in part 
because of the successful efforts of the wealthy to resist progressive taxation. The wealthy in 
turn have more savings to invest in the public debt, and come to own a greater share of it. 
Under the debt state, the laboring masses do not pay the financial aristocracy’s interest 
income. Yet with tax stagnation and declining tax progressivity, the aristocracy cannot be 
said to finance its own interest income either. Instead, when increased ownership 
concentration and a rising public debt are coupled with tax stagnation, the government 
comes to finance its expenditures, on interest and everything else, by borrowing from the 
rich, instead of taxing them (see also Piketty, 2014, p. 540). In this way, Streek (ibid, p. 78) 
argues, the ‘…debt state serves to perpetuate extant patterns of social stratification and the 
social inequality built into them’.  
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4. Public Debt as Political Power?  
 
In addition to its role in reinforcing inequality, there has always been an assumption that 
concentration gives owners of the public debt political power to shape government 
policymaking (Di Muzio, 2007). Does concentrated ownership of the public debt empower 
the aristocracy of finance? And if so, how can we empirically demonstrate the power that it 
wields?  
 
Empirically analyzing the relationship between public debt ownership and power is difficult, 
because governments are complex entities, subject to many different influences. Although 
the bond market is central, especially to fiscal and monetary policy, it is not the only site 
where influence over government is exerted. There are many avenues through which the 
aristocracy of finance could influence government that go well beyond the power conferred 
by ownership of the public debt. The most obvious example here is the pressures for 
financial deregulation that large financial corporations exert through lobbying and revolving 
doors between their upper management and government institutions (see Hager, 2012). This 
example is crucial because the emergence of the debt state was inextricably linked to 
financial deregulation, which enabled the financial sector to expand credit in order to meet 
the state’s increasing borrowing requirements (Krippner, 2011; Streeck, 2014). It is difficult 
to determine with any precision, especially given patchy data, to what extent a change in 
government policy was brought about by a change in the pattern of public debt ownership 
or by lobbying, or both. In short, public debt ownership concentration and financial sector 
lobbying are entangled in the same underlying process: the rise of finance.  
 
Despite these limitations, what we can do is examine the extent to which government policy 
has transformed in ways that prioritize the interests of government bondholders over other 
segments of the population. This exercise does not tell us much about the causal effects of 
public debt ownership concentration, nor does it address the rather contentious theoretical 
question of how policy discourse translates into power (Frow 1985). But this exercise does 
allow us to assess in general terms the extent to which government itself has absorbed the 
logic of finance.8 This is significant in itself because it allows us to gauge the role policy plays 
in reinforcing or counteracting the social inequality that we have identified with the debt 
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state. Our analysis explores two main questions. What are the interests of the new aristocracy 
of finance? And how do these interests conflict with other segments of the population? 
Once again, Streeck offers some guidance in addressing these questions.   
 
4.1 Staatsvolk versus Marktvolk 
 
In modern debt states, Streeck (2014, pp. 80-82) argues that governments have to juggle the 
interests of two main stakeholders, which are driven by conflicting logics of control. The 
first stakeholder is the general citizenry or Staatsvolk, which exerts influence over the political 
process through the rights of democratic citizenship. For the Staatsvolk, influence over 
government comes from voting in periodic elections and voicing public opinion in between 
them. As a nationally bound constituency, the Staatsvolk uses its influence mostly to preserve 
social rights and public services. The second stakeholder is the market people or Marktvolk, 
who, through concentrated ownership of the public debt, seek to influence government 
through the constant threat of imposing higher costs on government borrowing. The 
transnationally oriented Marktvolk is concerned primarily with the creditworthiness of 
government and maintaining confidence in the bond market as a safe and secure investment 
outlet. Streeck (ibid., p. 82) admits that, given the paucity of research on the public debt, it is 
not clear who the Marktvolk actually are, but he associates it with wealthy individuals and 
large financial corporations.  
 
Due to increasing levels of indebtedness, coupled with increased concentration in ownership 
of the public debt, Streeck argues that the debt state has come to serve the interests of the 
Marktvolk at the expense of the Staatsvolk. The conflicting interests of the two groups of 
stakeholders are presented in a highly stylized form in Table 2. 
 
In what follows, we engage in a simple empirical exercise, subjecting the framework in Table 
2 to content analysis. Here we are interested in measuring the frequency with which the 
respective terms associated with the Marktvolk and the Staatsvolk appear in government 
documents. For our purposes we concentrate our efforts on the three historical snapshot 
periods used previously (1957-1961, 1977-1981, 2006-2010) to examine the relationship 
between public debt ownership concentration and government policy. Put simply, when 
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government prioritizes the interests of the aristocracy of finance, we would expect to see the 
terms associated with the Marktvolk to gain prominence over the terms associated with the 
Staatsvolk.9  
 
Table 2  
The Two Subjects of the Debt State 
Staatsvolk  
(general citizenry) 
Marktvolk 
(market people or aristocracy of finance) 
national  international 
citizens investors 
civil rights claims 
voters creditors 
elections (periodic) auctions (continual) 
public opinion interest rates 
loyalty confidence 
public services debt service 
Source: Streeck (2014, p. 81) 
 
 
Our analysis examines the content of the Economic Report of the President (ERP), produced 
annually by the Chairperson of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers. The ERP is 
singled out because it is the key document through which the US President, the main elected 
figure in federal politics, justifies their economic policy to the wider population. There are 
also practical reasons for choosing the ERP. The reports span the time periods in which we 
are interested and have been digitalized, allowing for more expedient analysis.  
 
Table 3 plots the results of our content analysis of the ERP. In absolute terms, we see 
considerable changes in the references to the two subjects of the debt state. References to 
the Staatsvolk increase from the first period to the second (from 617 to 824) and then 
decrease in the third (577). Meanwhile references to the Marktvolk increase steadily through 
the three periods. What matters most, however, is not the absolute number of references, 
but the relative references to the two subjects, which are expressed as a ratio in the bottom 
line of the table. A ratio of less than 1 indicates that the terms associated with the Staatsvolk 
appear more often in the ERP than the terms associated with the Marktvolk. A ratio of more 
than 1 indicates that the terms associated with the Marktvolk appear more often in the ERP 
than the terms associated with the Staatsvolk.  
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Table 3 
The Two Subjects of the Debt State in Government Policy 
1957-1961 1977-1981 2006-2010 
international 
261 
national 
572 
international 
491 
national 
751 
international 
564 
national 
538 
investors 
19 
citizens 
26 
investors 
53 
citizens 
12 
investors 
222 
citizens 
34 
claims 
8 
civil rights 
0 
claims 
55 
civil rights 
0 
claims 
70 
civil rights 
0 
creditors 
0 
voters 
0 
creditors 
5 
voters 
2 
creditors 
11 
voters 
0 
auctions 
0 
elections 
4 
auctions 
13 
elections 
5 
auctions 
47 
elections 
1 
interest rates 
126 
public opinion 
10 
interest rates 
350 
public opinion 
3 
interest rates 
140 
public opinion 
0 
confidence 
40 
loyalty 
0 
confidence 
35 
loyalty 
2 
confidence 
50 
loyalty 
0 
debt service 
0 
public services 
5 
debt service 
3 
public services 
49 
debt service 
1 
public services 
4 
Marktvolk 
454 
Staatsvolk 
617 
Marktvolk 
1005 
Staatsvolk 
824 
Marktvolk 
1105 
Staatsvolk 
577 
ratio: 0.74 ratio: 1.22 ratio: 1.92 
Note: The numbers under each term represent the number of times that term is referred to in the Economic 
Report of the President over the five-year span. The ratio in the bottom row is the number of references to 
terms associated with the Marktvolk relative the number of references to terms associated with the Staatsvolk 
(see Table 2). Data and coding procedures are available from the author on request.  
 
Source: Economic Report of the President (various years).  
 
 
As we can see, the results of the content analysis are not perfectly correlated with ownership 
data in Table 1. The aristocracy of finance’s share of corporate holdings of the public debt 
was constant from the postwar to the early neoliberal period. Yet the number of references 
to the terms associated with the Marktvolk relative to those associated with the Staatsvolk 
increased over this time. One reason for this increase might have to do with the turbulence 
of the early neoliberal period, which fuelled federal government worries about inflation and 
the role of interest rates in containing it. Where we start to see significant change is from the 
early neoliberal period to the crisis. Over the past three decades, references to the terms 
associated with the Marktvolk have become much more frequent. In line with the dramatic 
increase in public debt ownership concentration, the ERP now makes twice as many 
references to the Marktvolk than to the Staatsvolk.  
 
This simple content analysis does not prove that increasing concentration in ownership of 
the public debt leads to increased power over government policy. But what it does do is 
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illustrate how the emergence of the debt state has been accompanied by a transformation in 
policy, one that provides an ideological climate that privileges the interests of government 
bondholders. Under the debt state, inequality in ownership of the public debt and inequality 
in representation within government policy have gone hand in hand.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The burgeoning literature on the financialization of contemporary capitalism draws attention 
to the rise of finance as both a class project and a transformative process (Overbeek, 2005, p. 
49). As a class project, financialization involves, at its core, the proliferation of financial 
assets and serves the interests of the large corporations and wealthy households that own 
and manage them. As a transformative process, financialization entails a change in the 
behaviors and strategies of key actors, with ‘financial motives’ taking precedence within the 
governing logic of capitalist societies (Epstein, 2005, p. 3).  
 
What the research in this article suggests is that both of these mutually reinforcing aspects of 
financialization are key to understanding the US debt state as it has evolved since the early 
1980s. The explosive rise in public indebtedness is part and parcel of the class project of 
financialization insofar as it reinforces inequality and empowers a new aristocracy of finance 
that dominates ownership of federal bonds. At the same time, a rising and increasingly 
concentrated public debt is integral to the transformative process of financialization, as it is 
accompanied by a shift that makes creditworthiness one of the overriding objectives of 
government policy. Above all, the research suggests that financialization is not a narrow 
‘economic’ phenomenon, but a holistic political economic one that has permeated everything 
from the corporation to everyday life to the institutions of modern government (van der 
Zwan, 2014).   
 
The political economy of the public debt has changed since Marx. But the recent rise of 
finance means that the nineteenth century concerns with ownership concentration and 
power have resurfaced. The new aristocracy of finance shares similarities with its nineteenth-
century counterpart, but has also been shown to differ in important respects. This pattern of 
continuity and change becomes intelligible only once we embark on the type of systematic 
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empirical research conducted in this project, unearthing, for the first time, the basic facts 
surrounding corporate ownership of the public debt. As Thomas Piketty (2014, 3) notes, 
social scientific research on the basic facts in general, and on the distribution of wealth and 
income in particular, is a necessary first step to go beyond speculation and generate rigorous 
knowledge that can ‘…inform democratic debate and focus attention on the right questions’. 
In the context of this research, one area of debate involves exploring in greater detail the 
implications of this changing pattern of public debt ownership for democracy itself. This 
would constitute an ideal starting point for public debate, as well as future research, into the 
topic.  
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Notes 
 
1. Broadly speaking, three main entities own the US public debt: US households, US 
businesses (both incorporated and unincorporated) and the rest of the world (both foreign 
official and foreign private investors). According to the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds 
data, over the past five years (2009-2014) US households owned on average nine percent of 
the US public debt, US businesses 23 percent and the rest of the world 48 percent. In the 
1950s, US households owned on average 31 percent of the US public debt, US businesses 52 
percent and the rest of the world only three percent. Domestically, US business remains 
dominant, owning on average 44 percent of the domestic share of the US public debt over 
the past five years. In future research, this project will explore the rise in foreign ownership 
of the public debt, assessing its implications for US power, and exploring its relation to 
domestic class politics.    
 
2. The late Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky (1996) and his followers have labeled the 
phase of capitalist development in the US since the 1970s as ‘money manager capitalism’ (see 
Nersisyan, 2012). One of the main features of this new phase is that highly leveraged 
institutional investors have replaced banking intermediaries as the ‘…proximate owners of a 
vast proportion of financial instruments’ (Minsky, 1996, p. 358). It should be noted that the 
significance of this development for the distribution of power within financial sector is 
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unclear given that banks, either directly or through multi-layered subsidiaries, are often the 
managers and owners of investment funds.  
 
3. Note that the data in Figure 2 and Figure 3 are from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds 
accounts. The flow of funds data are for the business sector as a whole, while the IRS data 
used in Table 1 and Figure 1 are for the corporate sector. In the end, however, the 
distinction makes little difference given that corporations are the dominant form of business 
enterprise in the US. According to the IRS’s Integrated Business Data, since 1980 
corporations have, on average, accounted for only 20 percent of all business tax returns, but 
87 percent of the business sector’s total sales and 71 percent of its net income.  
 
4. The data on mutual funds for 1983 (taxable and tax-free mutual funds) and 2010 (stock 
mutual funds, tax-free bond mutual funds, U.S. government or government backed bond 
mutual funds, other bond mutual funds, combination funds, other mutual funds) are from 
my own analysis of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, as are the data on 
pension funds for 1983 (thrift-type pension account assets, private pension benefits, IRA 
and Keogh accounts). The data on pension funds for 2010 (IRA and Keogh and other 
retirement accounts) are from Edward Wolff (2012, p. 69).  
 
5. These arguments have affinities with financialization literature that links the fortunes of 
the financial sector with the top one percent of households (Volscho and Kelly, 2012; Goda 
et al., 2014).  
 
6. The data in this paragraph and the following one are from Mitchell (1988).  
 
7. The data in this paragraph and the following one are from the White House Office of 
Management and Budget (http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals).  
 
8. This line of inquiry also has potentially valuable insights for our understanding of the rise 
of finance. As van der Zwan (2014, p. 118) notes, the effects of debt financing on the 
institutional architecture of government is an ‘underexposed topic’ within financialization 
studies.  
 
9. As a final precautionary note, it is worth mentioning that the terms Streeck associates with 
the Marktvolk and Staatsvolk are very general. In the ERP the term ‘confidence’ shows up 
frequently in the analysis, but usually in reference to investor confidence in the economy as a 
whole, and not specifically in relation to the government bond market. Still, the contention 
here is that even these general references provide an ideological climate favourable to 
dominant owners of the public debt.   
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